



**STRATEGY
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**THE CHALLENGES OF HAITI'S FUTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE CHALLENGES OF HAITI'S FUTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel J. Mike Simmons

TITLE: The Challenges of Haiti's Future: Implications for U.S. Policy and Strategy

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 09 April 2002

PAGES: 35

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This monograph analyzes United States' foreign policy objectives and strategy as applied to the country of Haiti. Specific emphasis is placed upon the events, policies, and actions which led to the 1994 United Nations-sanctioned military intervention, Operation Uphold Democracy. It then transitions to a present-day analysis of Haiti through the lens of the economic, diplomatic, and military elements of power. The paper concludes with some lessons learned and policy recommendations, all offered as possible solutions to assist in Haiti's on-going economic and political struggle. Unfortunately, Haiti's immediate future is quite bleak. Unless President Aristide can establish internal security, implement meaningful political reforms, and resurrect the dormant economy, the prospects for Haiti remain dim. So far, President Aristide has proven incapable of providing the requisite leadership necessary to make a difference.

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THE CHALLENGES OF HAITI'S FUTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY

The U.S. and Haitian governments have likewise been caught up in a constant process of crisis management, with public statements concentrated on immediate challenges rather than broadly based objectives. It is no wonder that the casual American observer is baffled as to where Haiti and U.S. policy toward Haiti is ultimately heading.

—Ernest H. Preeg
"The Haitian Dilemma" (1996)

The United States and Haiti have a lengthy history of political and economic affiliation which dates back to the early 1800s. However, the overall effectiveness of U.S. policy and strategy in Haiti has been problematic over the years as evidenced by the necessity to conduct two direct U.S. military interventions in Haiti in the 20th Century, first in 1915, and most recently in Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994. To prevent a resurgence of the conditions which led to Operation Uphold Democracy will require a proactive, deliberate and well thought-out strategy and subordinate set of policies in order to positively shape Haiti's future growth and development.

Though the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent War on Terrorism have moved to center stage for the United States, there are still a number of quantifiable arguments for remaining engaged and involved with Haiti. An effective strategy for Haiti will not only lessen the probability of another armed intervention there, but U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military interests could all see residual benefits as well. Additionally, a thorough analysis of the conditions and policies which affect U.S.-Haiti relations may lend themselves to application in future similar situations around the globe.

Economically, the United States is Haiti's largest trading partner and although Haiti maintains its dubious distinction as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, there are nevertheless sizable growth opportunities in assembly, manufacturing, other labor-intensive industry, and tourism.¹ While Haiti will not likely develop into the "Taiwan of the Caribbean," it does have a tremendous pool of untapped resources, primarily in the form of unskilled labor. That labor force and economic growth potential, combined with its close geographic proximity to the U.S., makes Haiti a viable option for economic investment, but only if the ruling government can provide a stable and secure environment in which businesses can operate.

Diplomatically and politically, Haiti continues to struggle. Though it has freely elected two presidents since Operation Uphold Democracy, with the most recent inauguration of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide occurring on 7 February, 2001,² the Haitian government's genuine

commitment to democratic institutions has been highly suspect. While the United States is currently focused on the War on Terrorism, it has not abandoned Haiti; at least not yet. On the contrary, speaking to the Heritage Foundation on 31 October, 2001, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Lorne Craner underscored the Bush Administration's commitment to human rights and democracy around the world:

The world has changed dramatically for all of us since September 11, and some people have expressed the concern that, as a result of the attacks on America, the Bush Administration will abandon human rights and democracy work. To those people I say boldly that this is not the case. In fact, maintaining the focus on human rights and democracy worldwide is an integral part of our response to the attack, and is even more essential today than before September 11th. They remain in our national interest in promoting a stable and democratic world.³

From a military perspective, Haiti presents a host of relatively minor security challenges to the United States predominately in drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and as a potential terrorist sanctuary. When viewed independently, these challenges are not tremendously burdensome, but collectively they can drain away precious military resources already stretched around the globe. By addressing these issues through effective policies and programs, the United States could better focus its military element of power on the truly vital national interests associated with the War on Terrorism. While complete military disengagement from Haiti is not likely or even feasible, a revised, selective strategy of focused military application could result in increased efficiency while simultaneously freeing resources for higher priority missions.

Finally, the downward spiral of growth and development in Haiti is characteristic of a significant number of very poor countries in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean region, countries with deep inner distress and turmoil, widespread human suffering, and generally on the verge of collapse or disintegration as a nation-state.⁴ This failed nation-state is described by Gerald Helman and Steve Ratner as "utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community." Further, they argue, the failed state threatens neighboring countries because civil strife, economic collapse, and the breakdown of food and health systems "force refugees to flee to adjacent countries."⁵

Robert Dorff carries the concept of a failed state even further. He places Haiti in a different category altogether: as simply exhausted. Nations in this category are characterized more by a "sweeping sense of despair and hopelessness."⁶ Regardless of the label, with its widespread poverty and systemic illegal immigration issues, Haiti clearly fits the description of the classic failed nation-state. Therefore, as a case study, Haiti offers some tremendous

potential insights and lessons on U.S. policy which may be applicable to many other nation-states around the globe that are also teetering on the brink of failure.

This paper briefly reviews the history of U.S.-Haiti relations, with particular emphasis on the events, policies, and actions which led to the 1994 United Nations-sanctioned military intervention, Operation Uphold Democracy. It then transitions to a present-day analysis of Haiti through the lens of the economic, diplomatic, and military elements of power. The paper concludes with some lessons learned and policy recommendations, all offered as possible solutions to assist in Haiti's on-going economic and political struggle.

BACKGROUND/HISTORY OF HAITI

After a violent slave revolt led by Toussant L'Ouverture, Haiti broke free from its French Colonial masters by formally declaring independence on January 1, 1804. From this tumultuous beginning emerged the Western Hemisphere's second independent republic (after the United States) and first modern-era nation founded by black people.⁷ Unlike the United States, however, Haiti emerged with numerous and seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Independence from France had left Haiti severely lacking in political institutions or economic leverage, and with large numbers of dead, a devastated infrastructure, and critically short in trained administrators and skilled craftsmen.⁸ Thus marked the beginning of Haiti's long and arduous quest for economic viability and democratic governance.

Independence, then, was probably the high mark of Haiti's initial foray onto the world scene, as incessant internal turmoil and rebellion were the only consistent behaviors of the newly-formed nation state. As a result of the constant cycle of violence, Haiti entered into almost immediate international isolation and has remained that way throughout much of its history.⁹ Ironically, the very country which consistently engaged with Haiti over the years, the United States, is routinely cited by many as the lead catalyst in her initial ostracism from the rest of the world. To that end, the U.S. was the last major power of the 19th Century to recognize Haiti, waiting until the American abolition of slavery in 1862 to establish formal relations.¹⁰

Just as slavery had a profound influence on the political development and national identity of the United States, so too was the case in Haiti. The combined effects of internal dissension, economic disparity, and political instability in Haiti can be traced back to the endemic racial conflicts between her poor black and affluent mulatto populations. Besides these internal divisions between dark- and light-skinned people, similar tensions between the educated and working class, and the urban and rural sections, all combined to create "a breeding ground for internal conflict" which continues to this day.¹¹ Over time, a predatory culture has evolved in

Haiti which pits the "haves" and the "have-nots" against each other in violent struggles for power and influence. This political culture of predation, founded primarily along skin color lines, has fostered an environment of autocracy and corruption, extreme social injustice, and economic stagnation which persists today.¹²

To underscore that fact, a review of Haitian politics from 1804 to 1990 reveals a government characterized by rampant instability and extreme violence, with over 40 changes in the heads of state.¹³ While the total number of changes is not particularly significant, the violent struggle associated with them is. Haitian history is replete with multiple attempts to break free from the cycle of autocracy, all of which ended in failure. Finally, pressured by dire internal economic challenges and the potential for lucrative foreign aid packages, Haiti acquiesced to international pressure, primarily from the United States and the Organization of American States (OAS), and held elections in December 1990. Jean-Bertrand Aristide won the election with over two-thirds of the vote and thus became the first democratically-elected president in Haiti's 187 years of independence.¹⁴ Haiti's experiment with democracy was extremely short-lived, however, as Aristide was removed from office by a military coup on 30 September 1991.¹⁵

U.S. POLICY/ACTIONS LEADING TO MILITARY INTERVENTION

In response to the overthrow of Haiti's legitimately elected president, the international community, once again led primarily by the United States and the OAS, and with the addition of the United Nations (UN), embarked on a series of political, economic, and military initiatives designed to reinstate Aristide. Articulated in a variety of venues by President George Bush, the U.S. policy was clear: the imperative to restore Aristide to power. In order to underscore his commitment to that end, President Bush tightened the diplomatic and economic screws by pledging U.S. support to an October 1991 OAS-sponsored embargo. Simultaneously, he also announced a freeze on all Haitian financial assets located in the United States.¹⁶

As a result of the embargo, Haiti's already dismal economic condition declined even further, and a mass exodus of Haitian refugees ensued. The U.S. Coast Guard intercepted over 41,000 Haitians at sea in 1991 and 1992, compared to approximately 25,000 picked up in the previous 10 years.¹⁷ Due to the immense volume of illegal immigrants, and associated political pressures in the United States, Washington adopted a policy of forced repatriation for the intercepted Haitians; a policy which was ultimately endorsed and upheld by the subsequent Clinton administration.¹⁸

Despite the on-going international pressures for Aristide's reinstatement, Haiti continued to function with an unconstitutional de facto regime empowered primarily through the armed

forces. By June of 1993, the United Nations was intimately involved in Haiti's affairs, imposing tightened international economic sanctions including an oil and arms embargo. These sanctions ultimately forced the Haitian government, led by General Raoul Cedras, to the bargaining table. In July 1993, General Cedras and President Aristide signed the UN-brokered Governor's Island Agreement which established a 10-step process for the restoration of Haiti's constitutional government and Aristide's return by October 30, 1993.¹⁹

As a direct result of the diplomatic effort, sanctions were immediately lifted and the UN prepared to send a multi-national force of over 1200 police monitors and engineers to restore the basic services and infrastructure of the country in anticipation of Aristide's planned return. But on October 11, General Cedras and the ruling military junta ultimately balked at Aristide's return by denying entry to the USS Harlan County, which contained the initial element of the force.²⁰ This act of defiance plunged Haiti back into an ever increasing cycle of repression and human rights violations.

Once again, illegal immigration, already exacerbated by Haiti's continued economic decline, skyrocketed to epidemic proportions. This mass exodus of Haitian immigrants is cited by numerous historians and scholars as the ultimate catalyst which led to the eventual U.S. military intervention in September 1994. In an article entitled "Refugee Policy: The 1994 Crisis," Andrew S. Fialo makes a strong case.

The continued threat of a massive refugee flow became the tail that wagged the dog and dictated the Clinton administration's political course of action. Given the lack of cooperation from most other countries in the hemisphere, the administration had little recourse other than to alter the political equation in Haiti through military intervention.²¹

Others have argued just as convincingly that the United States intervened in Haiti primarily due to domestic political issues which inordinately influenced foreign policy. Donald Schulz, a noted scholar and author of numerous recent works on Haiti, contends that Washington did not send troops in based on concerns over democracy or human rights abuses. Rather, the U.S. invasion was triggered by a divergence of domestic political pressures. First and foremost was the need to placate the Congressional Black Caucus and other interest groups associated with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. Second was the need to diffuse the Haitian and Cuban immigration crisis. Finally, President Clinton and American foreign policy was in dire need of a boost and could not afford to be turned away by a defiant, fourth-rate dictatorship.²²

Regardless of the underlying motivations for U.S. intervention in Haiti, with the Cedras regime defying the world, the international community moved towards an armed confrontation.

In May 1994, the UN again tightened economic sanctions. Following the subsequent expulsion of UN Human Rights Observers on July 11, 1994, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stoked the fires calling for military intervention. In very precise language, Christopher began the calculated process of generating public support by outlining the U.S. national interests in Haiti:

Supporting democracy in the western hemisphere; maintaining stability in the region; prevention of the overthrow of democratically-elected governments; protecting the lives of several hundred Americans in Haiti; and stopping the massive refugee flow.²³

Finally, on July 31, 1994, the UN went one step further by adopting a resolution authorizing member states "to use all means necessary to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military dictatorship," and to restore constitutional rule, including Aristide's presidency.²⁴ From an international legitimacy perspective, the requisite conditions for military intervention were now in place.

In the weeks that followed, President Clinton went about the work of building public support for the planned invasion of Haiti. In a televised address on September 15, 1994, he laid out his case to the American people, stating:

"...that armed thugs cannot be allowed to overturn the will of the people; that brutality against the people by the military regime in Haiti must stop; that the massive flow of Haitian refugees to the United States will not stop until democracy is restored in Haiti; and that American credibility as a world leader is at stake."²⁵

Further underscoring his resolve, the President spoke directly to his military commanders on September 18, the eve of the planned invasion. He articulated a theme centered on the restoration of democracy and human rights, and the cessation of illegal immigration.

"Our work is as old as our country. We are committed to putting an end to the most brutal regime in our own neighborhood. We are committed to restoring a democratically elected government. We're committed to preventing a further explosion of immigration in an effort that can destabilize a democracy in other areas and compromise our own future,...and we keep our commitments in the United States..."²⁶

So, after the failure of countless diplomatic initiatives, numerous economic incentives, a determined and sustained information campaign, and against a backdrop of contentious domestic political pressures, the military was offered as the only viable option remaining. The United States, as the lead agent in a United Nations-sponsored Multi-National Force (MNF), was now poised and ready to carry out a military operation to restore Aristide as the legitimate leader of Haiti's government. However, as a result of last minute diplomatic negotiations by former President Jimmy Carter with the de facto Haitian leadership, the 20,000-strong MNF was

able to peacefully enter the country on September 19, 1994. Operation Uphold Democracy, the military intervention designed to permit the Haitian political revolution to continue down the path of reform, had begun.²⁷

Despite the change from an opposed to a permissive entry, Operation Uphold Democracy maintained a consistent and clearly articulated set of strategic objectives. Derived from the President's various statements to the media and to his military commanders, the objectives for the operation were: removal of the illegally installed oppressive regime; reinstatement of the elected government (Aristide); and establishing a secure and stable environment in which the Haitian people could begin to rebuild their country.²⁸ By ending the longstanding internal instability of the Haitian government, Washington reasoned that the underlying cause of illegal immigration and the systematic abuse of Haitians on Haitians would likewise end.²⁹ Simply stated, President Clinton wanted to set the conditions for democracy to return to Haiti, and he wanted to do it as rapidly as possible without succumbing to long-term commitment by U.S. forces.³⁰ Whether or not the intervention was justified is a debate that still rages today.³¹

POST-UPHOLD DEMOCRACY HAITI: ARISTIDE'S INITIAL RETURN AND RENE PREVAL'S ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

In the short term, measured against President Clinton's stated objectives for Operation Uphold Democracy, the United States was successful. Following Cedras' exile to Panama, Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994 and was reinstated as the President. By March 1995, the MNF was replaced by a United Nations peacekeeping mission, and by March 1996, there were less than 500 U.S. security personnel remaining in Haiti.³² From the ashes of the former police force, the UN contingent trained a new civilian police unit, the Haiti National Police (HNP), designed to stabilize and secure the country while aiding and abetting the democratic process. Meanwhile President Aristide, in a bold attempt to close an ugly chapter on Haiti's record of repression and human rights abuses, formally abolished the old Haitian military. And, although mired by serious administrative problems and local violence, Haiti successfully held both local government and parliamentary elections between June and October 1995. Finally, in December 1995, Haiti conducted a presidential election. Rene Preval, Aristide's former prime minister in 1991, was elected with 88 percent of the vote and assumed the presidency in February 1996.³³

Under President Preval, whose five year term ended in 2001, Haiti did manage to make some minor progress, albeit minimal, in rebuilding infrastructure and increasing agricultural productivity.³⁴ However, much of the initial national unity associated with the ouster of the

military junta dissipated as Haitians began to wrestle with the enormity of the task of rebuilding their country. The Preval administration and the Haitian Congress embarked on a variety of programs and policies designed to revive Haiti's stagnant economy, stabilize the security environment, and legitimize the Haitian political system, but significant obstacles hindered any major progress.

Throughout Preval's tenure, Haiti remained the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with a poverty rate estimated to be as high as 75 percent. Due to the trade embargo levied on Haiti from 1991 through 1995, the country actually experienced an almost 24 percent contraction of its economy. Relying on his experience and background in business, President Preval initiated a host of economic reforms designed to get Haiti back on its feet. Principally, he sought to increase trade and privatize state enterprise, while concurrently reducing the size of government and improving its revenue collection capability.³⁵ Unfortunately, to the average Haitian, Preval's initiatives did little to improve their standard of living. In fact, in many cases, the programs were met with considerable resistance by the general population and may have actually led to short-term reductions in their quality of life.³⁶ Though some indicators for measuring economic performance generally showed positive trends, the annual GDP growth per capita for Haiti from 1996 through 2000 only averaged about 2.17 percent. In real terms, however, that figure is actually below what it was from 1979 through 1991, and when factored against Haiti's explosive population growth for the same period, real GDP per capita barely improved at all.³⁷

Problems persisted during Preval's administration in the agricultural sector, Haiti's biggest contributor to employment, which functioned well below its potential due to declining trends in world prices on Haiti's principal exports of sugar, coffee, bananas, and cocoa. Additionally, inflation ran at approximately 14.8 percent annual growth from 1996 through 2000, and Haiti's trade deficit reached a staggering U.S. \$800 million dollars in 1999.³⁸ Those economic challenges likewise had a profoundly negative impact on Preval's ability to improve Haiti's internal security and stability.

The overall security situation in Haiti showed a marked improvement immediately following Preval's election, but by no means did it reach a level deemed acceptable to the U.S. government. Following Aristide's dissolution of the Haitian armed forces and associated paramilitary organizations in 1995, the Haitian National Police (HNP) force was immediately stood up in its place. On an encouraging note, since its inception, the HNP, with U.S. assistance, recruited and trained more than 6000 personnel in modern law enforcement techniques.³⁹ In an opinion poll taken in the Summer of 1997, over 80 percent of urban Haitians

believed that the HNP was making progress as an effective police force.⁴⁰ Likewise, though subject to constant criticism, Haiti's judicial system made some modest improvements during the Preval administration. In November 2000, in an unprecedented display of the sanctity of justice, Haitian courts sentenced 12 former soldiers and paramilitary men to life in prison for a mass murder committed in 1994.⁴¹ This was arguably one of Preval's greatest, though limited, achievements in ensuring the proper application of the rules of law.⁴²

However, that is not to say that Preval's government did not have significant security-related problems. On the contrary, from 1996-2000, Haiti was recognized as a leading transshipment point for illegal narcotics, primarily cocaine being moved from Colombia to the United States via Florida. In fact, in July 2000, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency indicated that approximately 15 percent of the cocaine entering the United States came through Haiti.⁴³ Extensive corruption within the HNP, judiciary, and among a number of elected officials appears to be the common denominator and primary culprit behind Haiti's burgeoning drug trade. Colombian drug traffickers routinely infiltrated the fledgling police force and traditionally weak judicial system. Faced with low pay, bribery, lack of training, intimidation and assassination plots, many judges and police officers chose to protect their lives rather than uphold the law.⁴⁴ The HNP dismissed more than 530 officers from 1995-1999 due to corruption, abuse of power, and other disciplinary infractions.⁴⁵ Additionally, in December 2001, two Haitian Senators were credibly linked by a number of U.S. government agencies to narcotics trafficking in Haiti.⁴⁶

The drug trade (and its associated corruption) was but one of Preval's challenges. Politically motivated murders also continued to occur with alarming frequency. In April of 2000, a popular radio journalist, an opposition politician, and a leader in Haitian public health initiatives were all murdered under mysterious conditions.⁴⁷ Additionally, two other security concerns, criminal gangs and the proliferation of private security forces, have also challenged the HNP in recent years.⁴⁸

These events did not go unnoticed. In a United Nations General Assembly meeting in March 2001, the government of Haiti was urged to continue its work on improving the HNP in order to "curb the alarming increase in insecurity in the country."⁴⁹ So, despite some positive trends in Haiti's security situation during the Preval years, it will take a concerted effort by Haiti's government, judicial system, and the HNP to overcome the serious shortcomings and continue any progress.

When compared to the economic and security issues, the political situation in Haiti has been the most controversial and contentious since Aristide's reinstatement in 1995. From a

purely democratic perspective, the most positive aspect of Haiti's political process was the relatively peaceful restoration of Haiti's freely elected government. At the executive level, both Presidents Preval and Aristide, inaugurated in February 1996 and February 2001 respectively, took office with overwhelming majorities of the popular vote.

But countering the seemingly legitimate process of democracy has been numerous allegations of fraudulent election processes and procedures. The national elections for parliamentary representation in 1995 and 1997 were highly contested, both internally among rival political factions and externally among independent observers. Negotiations designed to accommodate opposition participation in government broke down in 1997, so President Preval suspended the legislature and essentially ruled the country by decree until new elections were held in May 2000.⁵⁰ Once again, however, these elections were also marred by controversy as opposition parties made allegations that the vote tabulation process was flawed. Upon review by international observers, primarily the OAS and a number of Western democracies including the United States, the results were ultimately condemned as fraudulent.⁵¹ As a result, the United States continues to hold significant amounts of direct financial aid to Haiti in abeyance while President Aristide attempts to resolve the political impasse.⁵²

THE CHALLENGE OF HAITI'S FUTURE: U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Over seven years have passed since the United States committed large-scale military forces in Haiti and yet many of the root causes which preceded that intervention remain visible today. While Haiti has made some small steps forward on its journey towards democracy, it has a tremendous number of challenges remaining that must be overcome. In 1997, the Director of the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon, clearly articulated Haiti's dilemma, and the description is equally valid today.

Haiti's nascent and fragile democracy remains at risk. The United States and the international community have critical choices to make about the nature, extent, and longevity of their efforts in the country. On the one hand, the task of fostering a stable government, economic growth, and domestic security faces daunting obstacles, perhaps not ever fully amenable to foreign resolution. On the other, the cost of giving up includes the prospect of a breakdown of public order and possible reversion to the state affairs that triggered intervention in the first place.⁵³

There is no single, magical solution for Haiti's problems. As the challenges of the country are multiple, interrelated, and complex, then so too must be the solutions. United States policy and strategy therefore must apply all the relevant dimensions of national power to address Haiti's concerns. Robert Dorff suggests that such a strategy for failed states like Haiti must

include a "prescription for curing what ails it." Further, he stipulates that the strategy must be comprehensive, "building effective governance first, and effective democracy second, ...and that this can only be done over the long term, focusing on developing civil society, attitudes, and norms of behavior, not just institutions and elections."⁵⁴ Other scholars and political scientists endorse Dorff's view on the need for a long term approach for Haiti since it has such a limited tradition of law and democratic process.⁵⁵ While U.S. policy must continue to collectively address Haiti's security, political, and economic concerns, the provision of public security combined with the administration of justice should be the top priority.

RETURN LAW AND ORDER

U.S. policy and strategy toward Haiti must be based on the premise that the foundation for Haiti's democratization process rests squarely on the shoulders of the nation's security apparatus, in this case, the HNP. President Aristide pledged to the United States in December 2000 to strengthen Haiti's judicial system while concurrently protecting the human rights of its citizens. At the same time, he also agreed to step-up Haitian cooperation with the U.S. in the fight against drug trafficking and money laundering.⁵⁶ Unfortunately, despite these assertions, this appears to be nothing more than flowery rhetoric, as there is no tangible evidence of progress in the country's internal security situation. In fact, there are actually a number of key indicators which clearly point to an overall worsening of security conditions in Haiti since Aristide's return.

Most alarming is the continued rise in Haitian political violence between supporters of Aristide's Lavalas Family Party and a variety of opposition groups. On December 3, 2001, Bringol Lindor, a popular Haitian journalist and news director for Haiti's Radio Echo 2000, was pulled from his car by an angry mob and hacked to death with machetes. Lindor had recently interviewed opposition politicians on his talk show and the assailants are believed to belong to a pro-Aristide grass roots group.⁵⁷ On December 17, 2001, armed commandos stormed the Haitian National Palace in Port-Au-Prince in an apparent coup attempt which was ultimately defeated by the HNP. As a result of the coup, the Organization of American States announced on 17 January, 2002, that they would establish a new permanent mission in Haiti.⁵⁸ Most recently, the judge assigned to investigate the April 2001 high profile murder of a prominent Haitian journalist, fled Haiti due to death threats and a lack of confidence in the Haitian judicial system.⁵⁹ All of these examples offer irrefutable evidence of the current fragility of Haiti's internal stability, and the deep cultural and ethnic divisions which persist to this day.

Aristide's top priority must be focused on halting Haiti's alarming resurgence in political violence and overall insecurity. In order to facilitate the continued growth of democracy in Haiti, U.S. policy and strategy must bolster Aristide's efforts at maintaining a stable and secure environment. To that end, the United States must continue to insist that Aristide address the major problems of his police and judicial institutions. Specifically, Haiti must (1) strengthen the HNP by filling all key leadership positions; (2) expand the force; (3) demand vigorous investigations of serious crimes; and (4) keep the police force out of politics. Likewise, in the judicial sector, Haiti must (1) reform its legal codes and judicial organizations and processes; (2) increase resources to adequately operate judicial institutions; and (3) implement an effective judicial oversight capability.⁶⁰

IMPLEMENT POLITICAL REFORMS

Political reforms are second only to security issues in terms of facilitating Haiti's journey toward democracy. Andrew Reding of the World Policy Institute noted that the restoration of the freely elected government of Haiti has only solved one part of the democracy equation: majority rule. The other half of democracy is ensuring adequate representation of minorities and effective protection of equal rights of all citizens.⁶¹ U.S. policy and strategy must ensure that Haiti's government recognizes, negotiates, and even compromises, when necessary, with all legitimate forms of minority opposition parties.

To complement the notion of equitable representation of all Haitians, the Government of Haiti should continue its efforts in reducing the size and scope of the central government bureaucracy while concurrently empowering provincial and city governments with more control over their finances and regulatory decisions.⁶² This, in turn, should provide another check and balance to the central government, strengthen the voice of the common man, and move Haiti down the path of national reconciliation.

This overarching challenge of national reconciliation is a recurrent theme in Haitian politics and has been an elusive goal since the nation gained its independence in 1804.⁶³ Just as President Aristide has pledged security reforms to the United States, he also agreed to implement two significant political reforms: holding runoff elections to settle disputes over the May 2000 Senate race, and establishing an electoral council with opposition parties.⁶⁴ Progress in both of these areas has been minimal at best. The Senatorial election issue, despite 17 attempts by the OAS to broker an agreement, remains contentious. In a visit in November 2001, Cesar Gaviria, the Secretary-General of the OAS, was unable to broker an agreement between the opposition parties. Until the election dispute is resolved, some \$500 million dollars

in U.S. aid and loans will remain frozen.⁶⁵ Further underscoring that fact, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell reiterated on 7 February, 2002, that the United States will not release loans back to the Haitian government "until the political crisis is resolved and until international financial institutions and the international community have some confidence in the government of Haiti to make best use of the funds."⁶⁶ The message is clear: Aristide must immediately negotiate with opposition leaders and institute political reforms, or the Haitian financial situation will only worsen.

RESURRECT A DORMANT ECONOMY

If Aristide can return law and order while simultaneously implementing political reforms, then and only then can he proceed with the most daunting and long term task ahead for Haiti: resurrecting its nearly dormant economy. In order to move Haiti from, in Aristide's words, "misery to poverty with dignity,"⁶⁷ he must implement budgetary and economic reform. And none too soon, as the Haitian economy is imploding due to skyrocketing food prices and a national currency that lost over 50 percent of its value in the last six months of 2000.⁶⁸

In the short term then, to break the cycle of despair, the United States should continue to allocate relief aid to the Haitian people primarily through non-governmental organizations. Improving the basic needs for the general population by resourcing programs in education and health care should immediately contribute to stabilizing Haiti. Pervasive ignorance is exacerbating Haiti's health problems; HIV/AIDS continues to be a growing health concern. Additionally, the economic infrastructure of Haiti, to include electrical power, telecommunications, and air and sea port facilities, also needs immediate financial support as well. Unfortunately, until the Haitian government rectifies the rampant inefficiencies in these sectors, the prospects for any large scale investment, whether private or public, appears remote.⁶⁹

Excessive reproduction rates are another concern. In his study of Haitian demographics and development, Ernest H. Preeg noted that the poor and largely uneducated rural population had a high rate of population growth. This increased population then places increased strains on the already limited amounts of arable land, which leads to migration problems. First, rural citizens migrate to urban settings. This creates social and political conflict as the increased city population competes over scarce jobs, inadequate infrastructure, and a political process which may leave them disenfranchised. Ultimately, this leads to increased urban violence in the form of criminal activity or popular uprisings.

If not addressed by the government, the socioeconomic situation which has sparked the nationalistic backlash and political turmoil will result in increased outward migration. In the words of Preeg, "a large outward migration is a key indicator that the overall development process has broken down and that the nation is losing its political and social cohesion."⁷⁰ This outward migration phenomenon occurred in the years leading up to Operation Uphold Democracy and there are disturbing indicators today that it is beginning to happen again. As of December 4, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted 20 percent more Haitian migrants when compared to all of 2000.⁷¹ While the total number of migrants is not yet alarming, the growth trend is cause for some concern.

Summarized, resolution of Haiti's long term economic issues requires a long term commitment by the United States and other international actors. In the economic sector, specific U.S. policy and strategy should support, (1) increasing income for the poor; (2) slowing down environmental degradation; (3) improving family health while controlling family size; and (4) increasing human capacity through education.⁷² To enable the country to first feed itself, and then increase its agricultural export capability, arable land must be conserved and non-arable land, where appropriate, must be replaced through a concerted reforestation effort. Social assistance, primarily in the form of family planning programs designed to return Haiti to a birth rate that it can support, is the second critical element in the long term nation-building program for Haiti. Emphasis in these two areas may have the greatest payoff in terms of sustained economic growth and development for the country.⁷³ But, as evidenced by the recent resignation of Haiti's Prime Minister, Jean-Marie Cherestal, the long term economic problems in Haiti require a series of long term solutions which heretofore have proven to be difficult to both implement and sustain.⁷⁴

CONCLUSIONS

According to the U.S. State Department, there are a number of vital U.S. national interests that require continued U.S. assistance to Haiti. Programs to alleviate hunger, increase access to education, combat environmental degradation, and incubate civil society are all vital to strengthening democracy, promoting economic growth, and reducing illegal immigration in Haiti.⁷⁵ To give Haiti a reasonable chance at achieving "poverty with dignity," the United States will have to integrate all the elements of power as it formulates and applies its policy and strategy toward Haiti. The U.S. military has already proven that it can conduct complex humanitarian operations in Haiti, but the military alone is not the answer. General Henry

Shelton, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summarized it best in his comments on Operation Uphold Democracy.

The lesson of Haiti, and of most other contingency operations in this decade, is that while military forces have excelled in achieving military tasks such as establishing order, separating combatants, or safeguarding relief supplies, they are less effective in solving non-military problems rooted in persistent cultural, economic, and political strife. In cases like Haiti, military forces can help create a secure environment in which to pursue lasting political and economic solutions—but they cannot achieve political outcomes by themselves. The burden still remains on statesman and the international community to pursue integrated approaches that employ a broad range of policy tools and processes to ensure long-term success.⁷⁶

President Bush clearly believes in the United States' commitment to fostering democracy around the globe. Citing an obligation to advance fundamental freedoms around the world, the Bush administration policy, articulated by Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Lorne Craner on October 31, 2001, is to focus on U.S. national interests "by advancing human rights and democracy in countries important to the United States." He further states that a third characteristic of the policy "will be a willingness to take on tough jobs, long term projects in countries and regions that today appear inhospitable to human rights and democracy."⁷⁷ Underscoring that commitment, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to Congress on February 5, 2002, that the United States' "primary goal must be to help ensure that the peoples of the Caribbean find new opportunities for work, prosperity, and a better life."⁷⁸

However, despite these policy statements, the real question is if Haiti does not begin to show marked improvement and clear indications of democratic reform, are the U.S. interests in the region important enough to warrant further engagement? With the Global War on Terrorism currently taking center stage of U.S. policy,⁷⁹ that's a tough question to answer. Unless Haiti reappears as a significant domestic political issue due to such factors as a surge in illegal immigration or increased drug transshipment activity, I believe U.S. involvement will only lessen.

Today, seven years after the 24,000 U.S. soldiers ushered Aristide back to power, Haiti remains an impoverished mess. Lawlessness, political corruption, and economic stagnation continue to thwart any chance for democratic growth in the country. Ultimately, the future of Haiti must be determined by Haitians. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide must move beyond flowery rhetoric and empty promises in order to end the country's political crisis and make democracy work. Until Aristide can rectify Haiti's abysmal internal security and establish a solid political system, the chances for economic recovery and growth remain extremely slim. Unfortunately, thus far, Aristide has proven incapable of providing the requisite leadership

necessary to deliver Haiti from the depths of anarchy and despair that has characterized it throughout its history. No amount of international aid is likely to solve what is a profound leadership problem.

Word Count = 6490

ENDNOTES

¹ This data was derived from CountryWatch.com, Country Review, Haiti, 2001-2002; available from <<http://www.countrywatch.com/countryreviews/haiti.html>>; Internet; accessed 26 August 2001, Chapter III, Economic Overview, 29-31.

² David Gonzalez, "Aristide Victorious in Haiti," The New York Times, 30 November 2000; available from <<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/30/world/30HAIT.html>>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2001.

³ Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, "Craner on the Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy," 31 October 2001; available from <<http://usifo.state.gov/products/washfile.html>>; Internet; accessed 7 November 2001.

⁴ Ernest H. Preeg, The Haitian Dilemma: A Case Study in Demographics, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), 2-3, 84.

⁵ Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Rätner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, 89 (Winter 1992-93), 3, 8.

⁶ Robert H. Dorff, "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability," Parameters, Summer 1996; available from <<http://www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/96summer/dorff.htm>>; Internet; accessed 7 September 2001, 5.

⁷ Kwame Anthony Appiah, and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Africana: the Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience (New York: Basic Civitas Book, 1999), 904.

⁸ Hans R. Schmit, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 25.

⁹ Preeg, 12.

¹⁰ Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990), 50-58, and Andrew Reding, "Haiti: An Agenda for Democracy", World Policy Institute, February 1996; available from <<http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/rea03/index.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2001, 3.

¹¹ John R. Ballard, Upholding Democracy, The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 16.

¹² Donald E. Schulz, Wither Haiti? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1 April 1996), iii, V-X.

¹³ Data for this sentence was derived from Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Nancy Gordon Heinl, and Michael Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1996), 785-794.

¹⁴ Lester H. Brune, The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, 1992-1998 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1998), 42,44.

¹⁵ Roland I. Perusse, Haitian Democracy Restored, 1991-1995 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1995), ix-x.

¹⁶ Heintz, 739.

¹⁷ CountryWatch.com, Country Review, Haiti, 2001-2002, 15.

¹⁸ Perusse, 26-46, and Ballard, 51.

¹⁹ Ballard, Appendix C.

²⁰ Perusse, 53. Mr. Perusse goes on to state that the Harlan County rebuff was a major embarrassment to the United States, sowing worldwide doubt on U.S. capacity to carry out its foreign policy commitments.

²¹ Andrew S. Faiola, "Refugee Policy: The 1994 Crisis," Haitian Frustrations, Dilemmas for U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), Georges A. Fauriol, Editor, 83.

²² Schulz, Conclusion. For a detailed analysis of what drove the United States to intervene in Haiti in 1994 see Joseph R. Nunez, "The United States Intervention of Haiti: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy," United States Army War College Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 November 2000). Nunez contends that the decisive factor which led to U.S. intervention in Haiti came from the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). According to Nunez, the CBC would "...support an unattractive though Democratic budget in exchange for U.S. military intervention to bring Aristide back...to Haiti." In other words, the President had to offer positive inducements in order to secure passage of his domestic agenda while placating a strong congressional voting block. Nunez claims that the Haitian intervention was the trade.

²³ Perusse, 95.

²⁴ Text, United Nations Security Council, "U.N. Security Council Resolution 940, July 31, 1994," Foreign Policy Bulletin 5 (September/October 1994): 19-20.

²⁵ Perusse, 101.

²⁶ Bob Shacochis, The Immaculate Invasion (New York: Viking Penguin, 1999), 72.

²⁷ Ballard, 212, 215.

²⁸ Robert Maguire, Edwige Balutansky, Jacques Fomerand, Larry Minear, William G. O'Neill, Thomas G. Weiss, and Sarah Zaidi, Occasional Paper #23, Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood, 1986 to 1996 (Providence, RI: The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1996), 59. For a detailed analysis of the U.S. policy objectives associated with the Haiti invasion see James L. Dunn, "Upholding/Restoring Democracy in Haiti: Did We Achieve Our Policy Objectives?," United States Army War College Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2001), Conclusions, 21. Dunn contends that the U.S. did accomplish its limited objectives. The

Haitian dictatorship was removed, President Aristide was returned to office, illegal immigration was stopped, American citizens and property were secured, U.S. troops were essentially out at the 18 month mark, and the Haitian National Police were trained and equipped. According to Dunn, President Clinton never guaranteed that Haitian democracy would work, he only promised them the opportunity to try.

²⁹ Ballard, 214.

³⁰ Schulz, Part IV, 2.

³¹ Joseph R. Nunez, "The United States Intervention of Haiti: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy," United States Army War College Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 November 2000), 31. Nunez contends that the intervention was not justified when assessed strictly through the lens of national security interests. It was only legitimate when evaluated against the ideals of democracy and human rights, but only if tempered with the domestic political motivations underlying the issue.

³² William J. Clinton, "The Fourth Report on the Continuing Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Haiti," 21 March 1996, 104th Congress, 2d Session, House Document 104-190. All available from <http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/legislative.html>; Internet; accessed 26 October 2001.

³³ Maguire, Balutansky, Fomerand, Minear, O'Neill, Weiss, and Zaidi, 66-68.

³⁴ CountryWatch.com, Country Review, Haiti, 2001-2002, 29,30.

³⁵ Ibid, summary of political conditions, government organization, foreign relations, defense forces, leader biography, and economic overview, 18-30.

³⁶ Donald E. Schulz, "Haiti: Will Things Fall Apart?," Parameters, Winter 1997-98; available from <<http://www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97winter/schulz.htm>>; Internet; accessed 7 September 2001, 8-9. Schulz claims that neoliberal economic reforms in an environment like Haiti's, where graft, corruption, and socioeconomic inequalities are immense, will likely lead to even greater inequalities and hardships in the near term. The challenge is in accepting the inevitable short term losses for hopefully long term gains—none of which can be guaranteed.

³⁷ The World Bank Group, "Haiti Country Brief," June 2000; available from <<http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/External/lac/lac.nsf/3af04372e7f23ef6852567d6006b38a3/e34?OpenDocument>>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2002. Also CountryWatch.com, 31.

³⁸ CountryWatch.com, Country Review, Haiti, 2001-2002, 31-37, derived from the tabular data.

³⁹ U.S. Department of State, Office of International Information Programs, Statement of Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, "Lack of Haitian Commitment Limited Success of U.S. Aid to Justice System," 19 September 2000; available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/islands/haiti22a.htm>>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2002, 3.

⁴⁰ Schulz, "Haiti: Will Things Fall Apart?," 5.

⁴¹ CountryWatch.com, Country Review, Haiti, 2001-2002, 19.

⁴² Text, United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti," 25 February 2000; available from AccessUN: Record Display; Internet; accessed 27 October 2001. According to the United Nations Security Council, Haiti made progress in its internal security during the Preval administration. Since 1995, the government of Haiti, with significant U.S. and international assistance, gave a great deal of priority to the institutional development of the HNP. That commitment resulted in increasingly "positive results in the areas of organization, effectiveness, and credibility." Further, the Council recommended to truly professionalize the force would require "an integrated effort at institutional development addressing the reform of the justice sector as a whole." That theme of police professionalization and judicial reform did not diminish. Subsequent UN recommendations reiterated the necessity of continued HNP efforts to improve their capabilities. See Text, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/118, "Situation of Human Rights in Haiti," 1 March 2001; available from AccessUN: Record Display; Internet; accessed 11 October 2001.

⁴³ Catherine Edwards, "Haiti Puts Hex on Clinton Policies", Insight on the News, 17 July 2000; available from <<http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?Did=000000056303263&Fmt=4&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx.htm>>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2001.

⁴⁴ Merlye Gelin-Adams, "Holding Up Democracy," The World Today, May 2000; available from <<http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?Did=000000054159930&Fmt=4&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx.htm>>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2002.

⁴⁵ Serge F. Kovalski, "Haiti's Police Accused of Lawlessness; U.S.-Trained Force Linked To Killings, Drug Offenses," The Washington Post, 28 September 1999; available from <<http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?Did=000000045317101&Fmt=4&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx.htm>>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2002.

⁴⁶ Jose DeCordoba, "Dead End: A Journalist's Murder Proves a Major Trial For Haiti's Democracy---Jean Dominique Made Lots Of Enemies, and So Did The Investigative Judge---Hacking to Death a Suspect," The Wall Street Journal, 29 January 2002; available from <<http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?Did=0000000103031133&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx.htm>>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2002.

⁴⁷ CountryWatch.com, Country Review, Haiti, 2001-2002, 18, and Edwards, 4-5. April 2000 saw the murder of popular journalist Jean Dominique, opposition politician Ducertain Armand, and public health advocate Dr. Harry Bordes. All are disturbing indicators of the recurring theme of Haitian government tolerance of politically motivated violence.

⁴⁸ Schulz, "Haiti: Will Things Fall Apart?," 5.

⁴⁹ Text, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/118, "Situation of Human Rights in Haiti," 1 March 2001; available from AccessUN: Record Display; Internet; accessed 11 October 2001, 3.

⁵⁰ Georges Fauriol, "The Americas: A Look at the Record of Clinton's Protégé in Haiti," The Wall Street Journal, 3 November 2000; available from <<http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?Did=000000063129723&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx.htm>>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2001.

⁵¹ Nora Boustany, "U.S. Waits for Aristide's Haiti to Deliver on New Promises of Reform," The Washington Post, 29 December 2000, available from <<http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?Did=000000065752021&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx.htm>>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2001.

⁵² Paul Farmer, Joseph P. Kennedy II, and Jeffrey Sachs, "U.S. Owes Aristide a Fair Chance to Govern," The Boston Globe, 30 June 2001, available from <<http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?Did=0000000074876801&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx.htm>>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2001.

⁵³ Richard H. Witherspoon, Foreword to "The Challenge of Haiti's Future, a Report on Conference Sponsored by the U.S. Army War College, Georgetown University, and the Inter-American Dialogue by Max Manwaring, Donald E. Schulz, Robert Maguire, Peter Hakim, and Abigail Horn," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 22 August 1997); available from <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs97/future/future.htm>>; Internet; accessed 7 September 2001.

⁵⁴ Dorff, 9.

⁵⁵ Ballard, 215.

⁵⁶ Farmer, Kennedy II, and Sachs, 2-3.

⁵⁷ Michael Norton, "Violence at Reporter's Funeral," Associated Press, 12 December 2001, available from <http://dailynews.yahoo.com/hx/ap/20011212/wl/Haiti_journalist_killed_1.html>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2001.

⁵⁸ Frank Davies, "OAS Expanding Mission in Haiti," The Miami Herald, 17 January 2002, available from <<http://www.miami.com/herald/content/news/carib/haiti/digdocs/088088.htm>>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2002.

⁵⁹ J. Charles, "Haiti Judge in Murder Case Flees Country Amid Fears," The Miami Herald, 18 January 2002, available from <<http://www.miami.com/herald/partners/yahoo/digdocs/089243.htm>>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2002.

⁶⁰ U.S. Department of State, Office of International Information Programs, Statement of Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, "Lack of Haitian Commitment Limited Success of U.S. Aid to Justice System," 19 September 2000; available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/islands/haiti22a.htm>>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2002, 2, 9-10.

⁶¹ Andrew Reding, "Haiti: An Agenda for Democracy", World Policy Institute, February 1996; available from <<http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/rea03/index.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 October 2001, 9, 19.

⁶² Preeg, 53.

⁶³ Ibid, 72.

⁶⁴ Farmer, Kennedy II, and Sachs, 2-3.

⁶⁵ Text, "Haitian Journalist Killed in Political Disturbance," Reuters, 4 December 2001, available from http://dailynews.yahoo.com/hix/nm/20011204/wl/haiti_journalist_dc_1.html; Internet; accessed 17 December 2001.

⁶⁶ Eli J. Lake, "Powell Rebuffs Caribbean Leaders on Haiti," United Press International, 7 February 2002, available from http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_printwire.asp?COUNTRY=73&UID=673459.html; Internet; accessed 9 February 2002.

⁶⁷ Ballard, 217.

⁶⁸ Fauriol, 3.

⁶⁹ The World Bank Group, "Haiti Country Brief," June 2000; available from <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/External/lac/lac.nsf/3af04372e7f23ef6852567d6006b38a3/e34?OpenDocument>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2002.

⁷⁰ Preeg, 8-9.

⁷¹ Jane Sutton, "U.S. Battles Rumors That Lure Haitian Migrants," Reuters, 4 December 2001, available from http://dailynews.yahoo.com/hix/nm/20011204/pl/haiti_migrants_dc_1.html; Internet; accessed 17 December 2001.

⁷² U.S. Agency for International Development, "Welcome to USAID/Haiti," available from <http://www.usaid.gov/ht/welcome.html>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2002.

⁷³ Preeg, 94-95, 104-105.

⁷⁴ Michael Norton, "Haiti's Prime Minister Resigns," The Washington Post Online, 18 January 2002, available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com>; Internet; accessed 6 February 2002.

⁷⁵ U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, "Statement of Explanation for Haiti Drug Certification," March 1, 2001; available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/islands/explanation.htm>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2002.

⁷⁶ Henry H. Shelton, "Contingency Operations in an Uncertain World: The Case of Haiti," Strategic Review (Fall 98): 40-41.

⁷⁷ Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, "Craner on the Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy," 31 October 2001; available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/washfile.html>; Internet; accessed 7 November 2001, 3.

⁷⁸ U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, "Testimony at Budget Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," 5 February 2002; available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/7797.htm>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2002, 8.

⁷⁹ Ibid, summarized from the entire document. During his testimony Secretary Powell stated that the top U.S. foreign policy priority is the War on Terrorism and that the U.S. is committed to playing a leading role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Though specific dollar figures are not yet available, the war and its subsequent reconstruction requirements alone are expected to cost in the billions.

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